Abstract: This papcr analyscs conceptual change. A rejccrion of purL' cxperience has prornprcd philnsophers of science to adopt a certain pcrspective from which to \'iew changes of belief. Popper. Kuhn, and others have analysed concL'ptual change 111 cerms of problems or anomalies. that is. in terms of contingent reasoning abour issues posed in the context of an inhcrited web of belief. This paper explores a more general analysis of conceptual changc in dialogue with thesc philosophe rs of sciencc. Srill. hecau~e changes of bdid are not all changes in scicnlific hdief, we ~eek to unpack concepn1al changc in tcrms of dilemmas. as opposed to anomalics or prohlcms. For a Mart. the notion of a d ilemma diffcr has to be bro;1dc r than that of an ;momaly ~incc it purports to apply to conceptual change as a whole. not just the transition from one era of normal science to another. In addition , we ~houl<l derach rhe notion of ;1 dilemma from the objectivism of Poppl'r's workl-3 prohlems. Key words: concept. change. belid. dilemmJ.
MARK BEVIR
How should we analyse change in beliefs, con cepts, ideas, or thought? Two sylized vicws stand as extreme answers to this question. On the one hand, logi<:al empiricists might argue that peoplc test their theoretical beliefs against pure obscrvations, rnodifying any heliefs that are in conflict w ith these observations; so, they might conclude, we can analyse concep tual change by showing certain observations falsified old heliefs w hile providing support for ncw ones. On the other hand, idealists might argue that people pursue consistency, modifying beliefs that are in conflict w ith one another; so, they might condude , we can analyse conceptual change by showing old beliefs contained two contradictory propositions that che new ones reconcile in an appropriate way. Most philosophers of science over the last thirty years or so have attempted to analyse scientific change not in terms o f expcricnces or inconsistencies, but in terms of problcms, as with Sir Karl Popper, or anomalies, as with Thomas Kuhn 1 • The emergence of the notions such as problem and anomaly reflect a trend in ph ilosophy away from atomistic emp iricism and toward meaning holism and the related notion of the web of belief!. Once philosophers accept that no experience can prove conclusively the truth of any given proposition, they generally conclude that what we accept as true depends on background theorics, albeit background theories ha rdened by convention. Once they conclude that what we accept as true depends on background theories, moreover, they are then prompted either to dismiss rational thought altogethcr by suggesting that background theories determine what we take to he true. or, more plausibly, to equate rational thought with attempts to improve background thcories by reflecting on che difficulties we find in them and in their relatio nship to our experien ce. Hence, contemporary philosophers of science often pose the question of how we should analyse scientific change as one of how to analyse individual reasoning about issues that arise against the background of an inherited body of knowledge. I wa nt to exp lore conceptual cha nge more generally through a consideration of che imp lications of meaning holism a nd the web of belief. St<e rt<, pectively K. Popper, Ohjecti1'<1 Kno1l'iedp, e. Au F.voltllionary 
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Any attempt to bring an analysis of conceptual change into line with that of scientific changc is likely to face objections to the implicit equation of all conceptual change with the . . reasonable· process that characterises science. In fact, however, the very developments in the philosophy and history of science to which I havc just refered also have contributed to a broader questioning of the model of scientific change asan inherently "reasonabJe .. proccss. This rethinking of science clearly suggests that we should operate not with a distinction between scientific and non-scientific change, but with one bctween "reasonable· and ·unreasonab[e. change. Although a complete analysis of conceptual change would cover both sides of the latter distinction, we might begin by offering an analysis of ·reasonable" change, while also noting that "tmreasonable· change is that motivated by rogue pro-attitudes and so best analysed in terms akin to hot irrationalities and even weakness of the wi!P.
Although the following analysis concerns only . . reasonab[e. conceptual change, this <loes not mean that it applies only to cases in which people clearly strove over a period of time to devise a response to an anomaly, problem, or dilcmma. People often change their beliefs in a flash -the resolution of an issue, the answer to a question, comes to them in a moment. When this happcns they do not seem to arrive at thcir new beliefs as a rcsult of a process of deliberation. This does not mean, however, that ·rcasonable" forms of explanatíon are inappropriate to such cases. We can never follow the actual psychological process by which índividuals make any conceptual change. Whenever we unpack such a psychological process, we do so by describing a series of psychological states -beliefs, proattitudes, and the like. No mattcr how many psychological states we thus identify. however, wc always come up against the moment when one gives way to another. Wc always come up against the questions of why and how an initial psychological statc gave rise to another. Any attempt to analyse conceptual change solcly in terms of psychological states necessarily runs aground on the rock of the nature of the connections between such states. ·Reasonable· forms of explanation come into their own in providing us with a means of avoiding this rock. They enable us to traverse those moments when people actually change their beliefs since the concept of ·rea-sonableness . . provídes us w ith an account of how one psychologícal state can arise out of another' . An analysis of -reaso nahle· conceptual change might begin from the philosophy of science as it has developcd during the broader philosophical shift from atomistic empiricism ro meaning holism and the web of b elief. Meaning holists arguc that a concept. proposition, or belief gains mt:aning only within the context of a larger language or web of bdier. One implication of meaning holism thus appears to he that we should reject the possibility of pure experience or pun: reason as a hasis for belief formation. We can not attach meaning to cxperienccs. or begin to reason. save in the context of an existing web of beliefs, which thus influences the content of our experiences and reasoning. J'vleaning holism, in implying that there are neither pure observations nor self-supporting beliefs. also suggests that no single ohservation or logical principie provides a sufficient analysis of conceptual change. Ce11ainly people want their webs of bclief to coincide with their experience of real ity. hut their expcrience of reality is theory-laden, so an ohservation alone can not require them to change their beliefs. Hence. we can not analyse changes o f belicf solely in terms of ohservations or experiences. Certainly too people seck lO make their webs of belief consistent. hut their beliefs refer to an externa! world , so rhc consistency they seek is consistency in terms of their understanding of the world. Thus, we can not analyse changes of helief solcly by refen: nce to the inner logic of a tradition or web of belids. Recause webs of belief are networks of interconnected concepts mapping onto reality ar various points, we cm analyse conceptual change only hy exploring the multiple ways in \Vhich a new undcrstancling interacts with an old web of heliefs. Sometimes we \Vil! h ave to show how a new experience promoted a new view of old theories. Ar other times we will luve ro shmv how a new theory promoced a new interpretation of old experiences. No single starting point underlies ali changes of belief. Rather. be liefs develop in a lluctuating process wiú1 ali sons of hel ief-; pushing and p ulling eme another in ali sorts of \vays.
Meaning holisrn encourages us to locate conceptual change at the 1110-menl when agents modify an inherited web o f beliefs in response to anomalies, problems. or d ilemmas. To locar<.: conceptual c hange at this point is to suggest that it is a more or less ubiquitous feature of human life. People are always confronting slightly novel circumstances that require them to apply ha~ long hecn rerognise<l. See frum among man y R. anew the beliefs tbey inherítecl. Moreover, because the beliefs that people inherit can not fix the critcria of their own application, when people confront novel circumstances, they have to develop their inheritance in what is thus a continua! process of conceptual change. \Vhenever people confront a new situation, they must extend their inherited concepts to encompass it. Even if a tradition, paradigm, or discourse appears to tell people how they shoulcl do so, it actually can provide them at most with a guide to what they might do, not a rnle decicling what they must do. A tradition or paradigm can point peopk in a given direction, but the only way they have of checking whether they have been true to it is by asking whether thcy and their fellow adherents are content with what they eventually decide to do. Thus, change occurs even on those occasions when people think they are aclhering strictly to a tradition they regarcl as sacrosanct.
The ubiquity of change also reflects the fact that people always think about. ancl perhaps try to improve upon, their inheritance. Every time anycme reflects on the concepts they inherit, they are liable to become aware of difficulties with those concepts. and their concern to resolve these difficulties typically \vill then prompt them to modify the concepts. Even if people think they are striving only to unclerstand correctly a tradition they regard as sacrosanct, their effon to do so will involve their exercising their reason, which, in turn, \Vill entail their developing the traclition . No doubt some traditions, such as one based on a single divine revelation, encourage their adherents to describe the results of their reasoning as eluciclations, not inno\'ations. No doubt, moreover. some traditions, sueh as modern science, encourage their adherents actively to seek innovations. In both cases, however, innovation necessarily occurs if only as a result of the humble effort to understand what has gone before.
Conceptual change does not occur as a series of ranclom fluctuations totally unrelated to human agency, nor is it exclusively the result of the self-conscious attempts of a few thinkers to devise a more coherent set of beliefs; rather, it occurs because \Ve are agents who reflect on the traditio ns we inherit in the light of our own experiences ami thereby alter these traditions in accord with our own reasoning.
l\.Ieaning holism provicles us \Vith the impetous to search for a general analysis of ubiquitous conceptual change along the path already trodden by philosophers of science. Nonethdess, we have to modify the theories of Kuhn and Popper if we are to make them serve us beyoncl the confines of science -we have to re think ,a nomalies .. and ·problems• as ·dilernmas•. Kuhn in particular is led by his focus on science to take for granted things such as che predominantly empirical nature of beliefs, a high leve! of agreement about background theories, and a share<l comrnitment to advancing knowledge througb experimentacion. Even if these assumptions are appropriate when one explores the sociology of conceptual change in science, they have no place in a n analysis o f conceptual change more generally. Not eve1yone reasons in the ways that characterise the scientific community, so wt: can not explain ali changes in all webs of belief in the ways we might explain the changing content of scicntific knowledge. Much of our analysis of the concept of a dilemma, therefore, will consist of an emphasis on the neecl to ensure that it remains broader than che alternatives deployed by philosophers of science.
A dilemma is a ncw belief which merely by virtue of the fact that one accepts it as tme poses a question of one's existing beliefs. It is important to recognise here that we can not identify dilemmas exclusively with facts. Philosophers of science are incline<l to cliscuss a nomalies, problems, and the like as if they are typically factual beliefs generated by experiments 6 . Even if the y reasonably can do so in so far as they restrict their a ttention to the case of science, once we look beyond science we can no longer do so. A fact can constitute a dilemma: for example, the <liscovery by Victorian geologists that many rocks were far too old to fit into the cosmology that theologian s had derived from the Bible constituted a dilemma for Christians who helieved Gencsis required the world to be about five thousand years ole!. However, theories that are quite clistant from observations also can constitute dilemmas: for example, the theory of evolution proved an even greate r stumbling-block than geology for many Victorian Christians. Even moral beliefs with little observational content can act as dilemmas: for example, Victorian Christians often reacted strongly against talk of hell-fire and eternal damnation precisely because they believed these theological doctrines were immorar. So, a new understanding can constitue a dilemma wherever it might lie on the spectrum that passes from exempla1y p erceptions w ith little theoretical content to complex theoretical constructions w ith only a d istant basis in perceptions. What turns an understanding into a clilemma is the authority it posseses for thc person for whom it constitutes a dilemma, and it acquires this authority simply beca use that person acOne notable excepcion is Kuhn's adm1rnhle concern to allow for ·inventions, or novclties of theory,· as well as ·discovcries o f fact,. an<l his e4ually admirable rewgnition of the -excee<lingly anificial· nature of the distinclio n between the twu. Kuhn. Stmctttr<! of Scümtific Rec10/utions. p. 52. cepts it as trne. When people accep t an understanding as true, they c ome to believe it, so they incorporate it into their existing webs of belief, and they the reby necessarily extend or o the1wise modify their helicfs.
Whenever \Ve come to believe something new, we confront tht: dilemma of how we are going to incorporate it w ithin our existing web of beliefs. Here too we have a contrast between the concept of a dilemma and sitnilar concepts found in the philosophy of science . The stability of science -the fact that most changes in scientific beliefs extend existing theories rather than overturning them -encourages philoso phers of science, notably Kuhn, to focus on the rare anomalics that lead scientists to renounce a number of entrenched thcories. Anomalies are the rare pieces of factual evidence or theoretical innovations that con flict with the then established paracligm. In Kulm 's vie'N. then, anomalies are responsible only for the occasional, revo lutiona ry transformation: most conceptual change occurs when .scientists extend a ruling paradigm. He says, "resistance guarantees that scientists will not be lightly distracted and that the anomalies that lead to paradigm change will penetrate existing knowledge to the core·". Dilemmas, in contrast, arise ali the time, for they includ e not only the rare anomalies that prompt scicntists to make drastic changes to their wcbs of belief. but also the concerns that prompt scientists to e xtend prevailing theories during a period of normal science, ami even the trivial puzzles that lead ali of u.s to aclopt new beliefs ali the time in our everyday existence.
An analysis of dilemmas sh ould distinguish them not only from Kuhn's anomalies , but also from the more objectivist problems invoked by Popper. Although philosophers of science, induding Kuhn, sometimes appea r to ascribe to anomalies or prohlems a n existence independent of individuals, we can often unpack the ir concepts as inter-subjective emes; we can say that the strong consensus among scientists means an a nomaly or problem in science usually afflicts a number of scientists who share the beliefs that give it its character''. Popper, in contrasc, explicitly rejects any such intersubjcctive account of p roblems in favour of objectivism. He claims that pmblems exist indepcndently of the beliefs of every individual subject. He writes, for e xample, that proble ms "need not have their conscious counterpa1t" and even ·where they havc their conscious counte rpart, the conscious Kuhn, Sci<!nlijic Remlutwns, p. 65 Kuhn, fo r e xample, rather surprisingly talks of anomalies appearing bc:cause of a •rc:c:ognition that naturc h;ts somehow vJulated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science• Ihid.. pp. 52-3. Surely, however. it h people"s inte r-subjcctive be liefa about nature. not nature itself. which c:hallcnge par.idigrns. 10 . Popper reaches his ohjectivist v iew of p rohlems hecause he regards them as cliffic ulties in rheories 1ha1 themselvcs exist independently of eve1y individual subject in World-three.
Argumentos de H¡tzcín
According to Popper, \Vurld-one is the physical world of p articles, waves. ancl the like: \X'orld-two is the mental one of states of conscio usness, including beliefs. emotions. and the like: a nd World-three consists of the products of consciousncss. such as theoretical systems, cri!ical arguments, and problems. World-three consists of objectivc rhoughts that possess an autonomous existcnce quite apart from the actual beliefa of individ u als: it contains !he intended and uninrende<l products of individual minds in so far as thcy persis! indepen<lently of a ll minds in things such as biological organs. language. ami books.
TI1e weak ness of Pop ¡x:r's posi!ion appea rs in thc notio n that the theories. arguments, ancl problems puhlish ed in journa ls ::.md books are mere marks on pages apart from when particular indivi<luals attach meanings to them. As marks on pages. moreover. they are meaning less, an<l so do not constitute theories. argume nts, and prohlems at ali. A theory is a theory only if it is held hy somcone. What is more. hecause there are no theories in a Popperian World-rhn.:e. there can not be objective prohlcms afl1icting them. Hecause any theory must be a suhjective or inrersubjective one held by panicular in<lividuals. problems nrnst be suhjective o r intersubjectivc dilemmas.
Imagine that Popper reconstructed an ohjective World-three problemsituation as X, w he re X makes it rational for scientists to helie\'e Y. so that Popper could explains a scicntist believing Y by saying it was the rational th ing to do in the situation X. Imagine now, however, that the scien tist's suhjecti\'e understan<ling of the prohlcm-siluation in \Xforld-two was Z, not X. Surcly 've cm not accept Popper's analysis tha t the scientist hdievcd Y because the pro blem-situation was X? Surcly w e must analyse thc relevant concepmal change in tcrms of the scicnrist comíng to believe Y in the context of his or h e r suhjectivc unclerstan<ling Z?
Let us turn n ow from the dilemmas that inspire c hanges of belief to the natu re of the changes they inspire. Th e way people respond to any gin:n dilcmma rdlects hoth the character of the clilemma a nd the content of their existing wehs of bdid. Consider the influe nce of the character o f a NOTES TOWARD A':\ A:\Al.YS!S OF CONCEl'TlJAl. CHAl\:GE 21 dilemma on the changes people make in response to it. When confronted w ith a new understanding, people must e ither reject it or develop their existing beliefa to accommodate it. If they reject ir, their beliefs will re main unchanged. If they de\·elo p their beliefs to accommodate ir, they must do so in a way that makes room for it, so thc modifications they make to their belids must rdkct its character. To face a dilemma is to ask w hat an authoritativc understanding says about how the world is, and. of course, to ask a qucstion is always to adopt a perspective from whic:h to loo k for an answer. Every dilemma thus points us to ways in which we might resolve it. For example, se\·eral Victorians resolved the conflict they perceived be1\veen faith al1(1 the th eory of evolution b y arguing that God is irnmanent in the evolution:lly process -God worked through natural processes in the \vorld , rather tban inteffcning miraculously from beyond. They recunciled the thco1y of evolution with a belief in God by presenting the eYolutionary process as itself a manifcstation of God's will. Their new web of beliefs induded a n.:ligious rendition of the new underst:rnding th:.ll constiluted a dilemma for them.
Consider now the influence of people·s exL~ting webs of belief on the nature uf the changes they make in resp on se 10 a dilemma. lf peoplc are tu acconunodate a new understanding, they must h ook it on to aspects of their existing b elicfs, whcrc the content uf their existing beliefs makes certain hooks available to them. To find a home for a new belief among their existing emes, th ey have to connect the two, and the connections they can make clepend on the nature uf their e xisting beliefs. When we react to a clilemma. we do so by drawing on themes already present in o ur beliefs, and this means that these themes necessarily influence the way in which our beliefs change. For cxample, thc p amheistic heliefs associated with the romantics provicled sorne Victorians \Vith a hook on which to hang a theory of evolution. They moved from a pantheistic faith in nature as a mude of Gocl's being by way uf the theory of evolution to an immanentist faith according to which God worked bis will through natural processes in the world. They reconciled the theory of evolution with faith in God by hooking the former on to pantheistic themes in their existing beliefs. Their new web of heliefs incorporated an cvolutionary rendition of the m es drawn from thei r o lcl one.
After people find hooks in their existing wehs of belief on which ro hang the understanding constitutive o f a dilemma, they have to go on to modify severa! more uf their e xisting beliefa. To see why th is is so, we need to rememhcr that meanin g holism implies that our beliefs map onto MARK BEVlR realily only as webs. Thus, a change in any one belief requires compensating and corresponding changes to be made to other, related heliefs . A new understanding affocts a web of beliefs somewhat as a stone does a pool of water into which it falls -a <listurbance occurs at the place where the stone e nters the water, and from then: ripples sprea<l out, gradually fading away as onc recedes from the centre of the d isturbance. Once again, the additional cl1anges people thus make to their helicfa rdlect both the character of thc <lilenuna a n<l thc content of thcir existing beliefs. Each adjustment they make enriches the themes that bring the new underst:.mding into a coherent relationship w ith their existing beliefs.
The process of conceptual chan ge is an open-cnded one in that pople resolve dilemmas by creatively using their current webs of belief rather than by passively following them. Here passively to follow a web uf beliefs would be to draw out consequences already contained w ithin it: the existing web of beliefs would fi x the way in wh ich someone resolved the dilemma. The notion that people might simply apply their beliefs appears to be undermined by one rendition uf Wittgenstein's aecount of rule-following -no rule, no web of b eliefs, can define the criteria of its own application11. So, any existing web of beliefs provides hints as to how one m ight procee<l, but it is always possible for someone to neglect any given hint. Whenever people use a web of beliefs to respond to a dilemma, they draw on its resources as a guide to how to modify their beliefs to accommodate the understanding constitutive of the dile mma. Nonetheless, people's existing beliefs will suggest severa! ways of resolving any <lilemma, and the only way they have of checking the adequacy of the particular \vay in which they happen to use their existing beliefs is to ask if they and their fellows are content with the way in which they do so. No doubt some changcs of belief seem to entail nothing more than the passive following of an existing web of belicfs. However, these cases are merely those when we happen to accept the a<lequacy of the way in which the people concerned used the ir beliefs to resolve the relevant dile mma. \Vhenever we think p eople appliecl their beliefs in the way they sho uld havc done, we will be inclined to say that they were true to thcir beliefs. \Ve will say such things, however, simply because we judge it is so, not because the ir application uf their old beliefs corresp onds to criteria fixed by those beliefs.
It is perhaps worth pausing here to note that because wcbs of belief <lo not circumscribe the ways in which people might develop thcm in re- sponse to a dilemma. we can not predict with any cenainty how people will respond to a dilemma. Even if we have knowle<lge of their existing beliefs an<l the dilemma, ali we can offer is an informed conjecture 12 • The implication of this inability to pred ict is, of course, that there is something amiss in too straightforward an assimilation of the explanation of con ceptual changes to the model of causation associated with the natural sciences.
We have found that a dilenuna is a new belief, where any new belief, merely by virtue of being adopted, poses a question of the web of beliefs into which it is inserte<l. A <lilemma thus arises whenever people's reflections in relation to their experiences lea<l them to adopt a new u nderstanding as authoritative. Although our theories always enter into our experiences, our experiences still influence the beliefs we eventually come to hold since they pose questions for the heliefs we inhe rit. The notion of a dilemma thus provides one way of acknowledging the importance of the natural and socia l worlds as influences upon our concepts.
Attempts to rd ate our concepts to experience raise the question of whether or not we cm privilege one type of experience, or understanding thereof, as the sole or primary source of conceptual change. Do economic, political, o r sorne other set of experiences -or do epistemological, semiotk , or some other set of understandings -have a privileged role as a source o f conceptual change? The generality of the notion of a d ilemma certainly suggests that we might ask whether we can reduce d ilemmas to a specific type of experience or understandíng -whethe r that be economic exp eriences, semiotic theories, or the quest for pmver an<l officell.
If we could reduce dilemmas to a single type of unclerstanding, then all o f our beliefs would take theír validity from that basic type of u nderstanding. In contrast, meaning holism ímplies that our beliefs rese mble a spherical web, n ot a pyramicl. Our beliefs do not fo llow from one another in a chain securec.l at a single point to a particular type of theo1y-laden experience. Rather, our beliefs all draw support from une a nother as they " Je has heen argued that the language in w hich we d iscus.' heliefs does not e ven prnv1tle a mean' of making su<·h conjectures b u t only of living tog<:!her. See A. Morton, ·Folk Psychology is not a Pn:tlicrive Device·. /l ,fí11d 105 (1996) , 119-37. Surely, however, it enables us to live rogether precisley because it pro,·ides us with a me:m s of making such conjectures. 
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MARK BEVIR map o nto reality as a compl<.:x who le. Again, no one type of exp erie nce c.::111 fi x the belief-; we come to hok l because we play a n active role in constructing our experi<.:nces in terrns of our current webs of belief, and these webs of belief incorporare belids about th ings other than any one type of experie ncc.
Ali our experiences ancl ali our lx:liefs link up wi th one another -they form a seamless web. Although wc can categorise a specific set o f experiences ami bclieb as such ami such an arca of life, the categories we deploy <lo not dernarcate isolated, self-sufficient areas of lite. Moreover, because al! areas of life thus depend o n others, we c m not identify any arca of life as a uthoritative over al! others. Most individuals. for example, have experiences of work and of God. and tht::se experiences are satu rated with their existing economic and religious beliefs. which . in turn, interpenetrate w ith the rest of their webs of belief. This means . first. th a t th eir understand ing of work and o f faith interact with each other because they exist as parts of a single worldview, ancl, secondly, thal we can not re d uce either typt:: of undcrstanding to the other since their interaction is reciprocal. A rcligious belief can influe nce one's political views: a spiritual belief in the importance of detach ing oneself from the world mig ht lead someone to p olitical quietism. Equally, h owever, an understan ding associated w ith work can influence one's relig ious v iews: a belief that a de nominatio n favours an cconomic group might lead someone to worship elsewhere. The different arcas of life are neither indepe ndent of o ne a noth er nor reducible to one another.
CONCLl'SJOt-;
Hu man scientists are still indin ec! to treat conceptual change as if it vvere a p roduct either of autonornous human agency or of the inter na! logic of a tradition or d iscourse. Recent philosophy of science. in contras!, encourages us ro analysc such c hange in terms of individual reasoning within rhe context of a n in herited web of belief. Conceptual cha nge arises, in other worcls, as people respond to anomalies orO problems.
However, although recent p hilosophy of scit::nce, tied as n is to a broad holism, e ncourages us to analyse conceptual change in some su ch fashio n. the more d etaile<l concent it ascribes to the notions of an anomaly o r problem can not always be adoptcd wholcsale to an analysis of su ch change in general. In p articula r. we n ee<l to adopt a n orio n such as dilernArgumt'ntos clt: ]{az<m Téc·nica, n" 8. 2005
!'\OTES TO \X'ARD A'.'J A:\ALYSIS OF CONCEl'Tl :AL CHANGE 25 ma that, firstly, avoids the objectivism associated w ith Popper's notion of a problem. and, secondly, covers not onl y the dramatic shifts rhat Kuhn exp lo res in te rms o f anomalies hut also the more mundane everyday c hanges of normal scie nn: and everyday lite. A dilemma here consists of any new he lie f. wh ich. merely be vi rtue o f our e ntertaining it , fo rces a reconsideratio n , and so development, of our existing web o f beliefs. Alrhough s u ch dil<.:mmas can arisl:' from nove l the01y-lade n e xperiences, thcy can also arise from theories with little din:cr ohscrvational content. EYen whcn they do arise frorn expcriences, moreover, we cannot identify any one type of expe rience as uniq uesly responsib lc for them.
